This study investigates the effects of inward foreign direct investment on local workers' wages by focusing on U.S. manufacturing industries for the period from 1987 to 1992. I use two different approaches to control individual characteristics and to implement estimation in this study: (1) One-step estimation with industry-state level of inward foreign direct investments, and (2) Two-step industry characteristic regression approach. I find that the higher presence of foreign firms is associated with higher local wages after workers' observable characteristics are controlled for in cross-section analysis. However, I did not find a positive association between inward FDI activities and industry wage premiums within industry in a panel data analysis.
Introduction
This study aims to provide additional evidence to the literature on the impact of inward foreign direct investment on local labor markets by investigating at inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in U.S. manufacturing industries. One of the important aspects of the recent globalization process is the increase in FDI stock. The ratio of world FDI stock to world gross domestic product increased from 5% to 16% from 1979 to 1999 and world FDI inflows also rose to 14% (UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2000) .
When local governments offer various benefits such as tax exemption and free or low cost land use to attract foreign investment, they hope that FDI inflows will create jobs and increase welfare for workers. This is the case for both local governments of developing countries and of developed countries. In 1999, 67.7% of total inward stock of FDI was distributed in developed countries while only 32.1% was distributed in developing countries (UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2000) .
In the United States, the value of inward foreign direct investment was merely one quarter of U.S. direct investment abroad in the late 1970s, but it had reached over three quarters of the level of U.S. direct investment abroad by 1997-99 (Lipsey, 2001 ).
Previous studies on the effect of inward FDI on labor market outcomes have shown that foreign firms are more productive and pay higher wages compared to 4 domestic firms (Lipsey, 1994 , Doms and Jensen, 1996 , Feliciano and Lipsey, 2001 ).
These studies have also noted that the increased presence of foreign manufacturing plants is associated with increases in real wages for all workers in that industry and local area. In other words, there exists a positive spillover-effect of foreign investment on the local labor market (Figlio and Blonigen, 2000, Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2001 ).
However, using the US manufacturing level data from 1977 to 1994, Blonigen and Slaughter (1999) conclude that inward FDI has not contributed to U.S.
within-industry skill upgrading. In fact, they found that greater Japanese Greenfield (new investment) affiliate's presence is significantly associated with lower relative demand for skilled workers. In high skill intensive industries, there is no evidence that foreign-owned establishments pay wages that are different from those paid by domestic-owned establishments (Feliciano and Robert Lipsey (2001) ). Furthermore, Hanson (2001) found some evidence that a host country's subsidies to foreign firms might actually lower its welfare.
As these contradictory findings on the effect of inward foreign direct investment on local labor markets suggest, there are several different mechanisms by which foreign investments might affect local wages. Hence they cannot be predetermined. Even if we assume that foreign firms pay higher wages than do domestic firms as several studies have found, their impact on local labor markets cannot be clearly predicted. This is primarily because the impact depends upon 5 whether foreign investments are carried out through new investment (Greenfield investment) or through mergers and acquisitions of local firms. This impact also depends on the relative demand for skilled/less skilled workers of foreign owned firms.
For instance, let's suppose that a foreign firm is established in a local area in which there are domestically owned firms that produce the same product as the new foreign firm and that the latter uses the same skill structure of its workers as domestic ones. This would suggest that the demand for skilled and less skilled workers in the local area will increase, positively impacting the wages for both. However, if a newly established foreign firm uses more skilled workers than the local firms use, then only the wages for skilled workers will increase. Table 1 summarizes the possible directions of local wage changes in the presence of foreign ownership. If foreign investments are carried out through the merger and acquisition of local firms, their impact on local wages is not clear for both skilled and less-skilled workers. Further, if the newly acquired firm uses the same management style that has practiced before changes in ownership structure, no significant changes in local wages will result immediately for both skilled and less-skilled workers. However, if foreign ownership tries a different management style, then local wages will also change accordingly. In the United States, approximately 95% of employment in new foreign direct investments have taken place in the form of acquisitions of existing local firms 6 between 1987 and 1992 (Feliciano and Lipsey, 1999) . Therefore, their impact on U.S. labor market cannot be predetermined clearly as described above.
In this study, I investigate the effects of inward foreign direct investment on local workers' wages by focusing on U.S. manufacturing industries for the period from 1987 to 1992 using individual level data. Previous studies that used the plant level data (or industry level) on wages could not control for variation of individual characteristics including occupational differences within workplaces and industries.
Two different approaches are used to control individual characteristics and to implement estimation in this study: (1) One-step estimation with industry-state level of inward foreign direct investments, and (2) Two-step industry characteristic regression approach.
The ideal data for this study would be individual level data that has information both on the ownership structure of firm and on the level of foreign ownership presence in local labor markets. Since no data exist for this purpose, I use grouping technique in micro data by using both Current Population Survey (CPS)
Merged Outgoing Groups and Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Foreign Direct
Investment in the U.S. Establishment data. Industry-state level cell is created for inward foreign direct investment levels in the first approach. I estimate inter-industry wage differentials and regress them on industry characteristics in the second approach.
To preview the results, I found that the fraction of foreign firms in the industry and the state is associated with higher wages after workers' observable characteristics are controlled for in cross section analysis. However, I did not find a positive association between inward FDI activities and industry wage premia within industry with a panel data analysis. In this analysis, inward FDI activities appeared to be negatively associated with worker's industry wage premium for workers with more than high a school education. This finding suggests that inward foreign direct investment has not contributed to the improvement of worker's welfare for the period from 1987 to 1992.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the methodology and data utilized in this study. Section three presents the econometric findings regarding the impact of inward FDI upon local worker's wages and discusses various interpretations of empirical evidences. The final section provides an overall assessment of this study and relates the findings here with the literature at large.
Methodology and Data
Previous econometric studies on the relationship between inward foreign direct investment and workers' wages have used firm average wages or industry average wages, and therefore did not control for workers ' Since I use the aggregated industry-state level data at individual micro data analysis, the associated econometric issue should be addressed. When the aggregation data are used at micro data analysis, it is likely to bias the estimates, which leads to incorrect standard errors that exaggerate the statistical significance of the included group variables (Moulton, 1986) . In order to implement the estimation of equation (1) and to obtain standard errors that are robust to a group structure in error term, I included group-level, which is an industry-state cell clustering in the estimation.
Two-stage Regression Approach
I also employ a two-step estimation method in order to examine the effects of inward foreign direct investment activity on inter-industry wage differentials in US manufacturing sector. This study on industry wage differentials is based on the assumption that industry wage differentials depend on industry characteristics. The extension sought in this study is that inward foreign direct investment activity also affects industry wage differentials as important industry characteristics. I estimated the effect of inward FDI on wages by including industry fixed effects in the regression analysis to control for industry-specific characteristics.
The wide wage differences across industries have been persistent for a long period of time (Kruger and Summers, 1987) and this fact has challenged standard competitive labor market theories (Katz and Summers, 1989; Borjas and Ramey, 2000) . The industry wage premium is the component of the wage that is given to individuals while working in the industry, but is not due to any specific individual characteristics, either observed or unobserved. 3 In this study, industry premia are treated as compensation for particular industry characteristics to see whether the presence of foreign ownership in the industry is associated with industry wage premia.
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There are two advantages in using this two-step approach over a one-step approach in this study. First, there are more detailed data on inward foreign direct investment that can be utilized with the two-step approach. In order to avoid disclosure of data on individual companies, BEA does not report information on employment and output information on industry-state level. For this reason, I am only able to use information of number on foreign firms in industry-state level in the previous one-step approach. However, I can utilize information about employment and output share of foreign firms in industry level with the two-stage approach because higher aggregation allows BEA to report data without the possibility of revealing information about individual firms. In addition, with the two-step approach, I can utilize longer period data on inward FDI to examine dynamics within industry.
A possible drawback of cross-section data analysis in the previous section is that it cannot be used to control for industry fixed effects that may be correlated with the regressors. The existence of such correlations can lead to biased estimates. In order to correct this problem and utilize more detailed data, I used industry fixed effect estimation in the second stage of the two-step regression approach. I used three different measures of inward FDI activity in US manufacturing industries in the fixed effect estimation: (1) the proportion of number of foreign-owned establishments in US manufacturing industries, (2) the proportion of employee hired by foreign-owned establishments in US manufacturing industries, and (3) the proportion of output produced by foreign-owned establishments in US manufacturing industries. Howenstein and Zeile (1994) found wage differential between foreign owned firms and domestically owned firms and they attributed the wage differential to the larger average size of the foreign firms by using U.S. manufacturing industry data 16 with detailed information on industry and location. Feliciano and Lipsey (1999) also found that the wage differential between foreign owned and domestically owned establishments disappears once controls such as average size of establishment, and unionization are added by using establishment level data. is shown that two measures of inward foreign direct investments activity are negatively associated with inter-industry wage differentials and they are statistically significant at 5% level except for the first column. This negative sign implies that workers wage premia due to their industry affiliation decreases as inward foreign direct investment activity increases. The estimated coefficient ranges from -0.08 to -0.13 depending on measure and specification, which implies that the pay for all workers is about 1 percent lower for any 10 point changes in foreign firms employment.
I also estimated the second-stage regression with different groups in terms of workers' educational attainment to see if inward FDI has different effects on wages across different skilled groups. The results are shown in the second and the third panels in table 6. Even though the null hypothesis of zero effect of inward FDI on wages cannot be rejected, the signs of coefficients in workers with up to high school education are uniformly negative. However, the negative effect of inward FDI activity becomes substantial and statistically significant in the case of skilled workers.
The estimated coefficients are around -0.20 implying that pay for workers with more than high school education decreases by 2% at any 10 points increase in inward foreign direct investment activity. Blonigen and Slaughter (2001) found no evidence that inward FDI activity contributed to skill upgrading in U.S. manufacturing industries by using industry level analysis and the result from the second-stage regression of this study support their findings. Additional regression of inter-industry wage differentials among union members on inward FDI activity fails to show statistical significance.
The contrast between results from the industry characteristics approach and results from the individual level analysis seems puzzling at first. However, this contradiction can be accounted for by differences between these two approaches.
While the first approach is a cross sectional approach, the second approach used The negative association of inward foreign direct investment activities with industry wage premiums, especially for skilled workers, might suggest an increase in competition within an industry between foreign owned and domestically owned firms.
Inter-industry wage differential captures the portion of rents that are given to workers.
It is possible for inter-industry wage differential to decrease as the whole size of rent shrinks, which results from more competition within an industry. Therefore, even though the presence of individual foreign establishment is associated with higher pay for individual workers, overall industry wage premium that workers used to enjoy can be negatively associated with higher foreign firms' activity within an industry, as the second-step regression results demonstrate.
It is also possible that more foreign firms within an industry are associated with a weaker bargaining position of skilled workers. Approximately 95% of employment in new foreign direct investments was in acquired enterprises between 1987 and 1992 (Feliciano and Lipsey, 1999) . Growing activity of foreign firms within industry could imply that domestic ownership has been simply converted to 20 foreign ownership. Under new management workers might feel more insecure about their job than under domestic ownership, for it is well known that the most important reason for the opposition of foreign ownership is the fear of job losses.
Conclusion
This paper explores the relationship between inward foreign direct investment and wages in U.S. manufacturing industries. If inward FDI takes place mostly by acquisition of existing domestically owned firms, the demand shift effects might not be large enough to influence wages in local labor market. Instead, even though foreign-owned firms tend to pay higher wages, it is not clear that workers benefit from new ownership structure and new management policy. It is also possible that increasing inward FDI activities within an industry can change a rent sharing system that would be persistent under local ownership by increasing competition among firms within industry.
Results from this study support this idea. This study demonstrated that the fraction of foreign firms in an industry and state is associated with higher pay for workers after workers observable characteristics are controlled in a cross section analysis. However, it did not find a positive association between inward FDI activities and industry wage premia within an industry with a panel data analysis.
Instead, inward FDI activities appeared to be negatively associated with worker's 21 industry wage premium among workers with more than a high school education. This finding suggests that inward foreign direct investment has not contributed to improve workers welfare for the period from 1987 to 1992.
This study extends the existing literature on effects of inward FDI in terms of two aspects. First, this study used individual level analysis in order to control workers characteristics in finding effects of inward FDI on wages. Previous empirical analysis in this field could not control workers characteristics since they used average firm or industry level wages. Second, this study also used a unique panel data set to understand dynamics of relationship between inward FDI activities and wages within industry. While previous studies that used industry-level panel data set could not control worker's characteristics, this study used two-stage estimation method to do so in analyzing effects of inward FDI on wages.
Results from this study suggest further studies are necessary to examine the impact of the growing presence of foreign ownership on the bargaining relationship between foreign owners and local workers and their spillover effects on domestically owned firms. Threat effects theory suggests that the threat by firms to move production abroad, or the threat to outsource may have an important impact on wages and profits even in the absence of large price or quantity changes due to changes in the environment of capital mobility, such as the establishment of NAFTA and WTO (Crotty, Epstein and Kelly, 1998, Rodrik, 1997; 1999 , Reddy 2000 . If foreign investors use the threat to move or close plants in bargaining situations, labor unions 22 might perceive it as a more credible threat than domestic firms. Therefore it is very important to look at the bargaining relationship between foreign owners and local workers (union) to understand effects of inward FDI activities on wages in local labor market theoretically and empirically. All regressions include industry and years dummies. Weights are equal to the inverse of the variance of the estimated wage differential in the first regression. Regressions for (1) and (2) include other control variables of industry characteristics: union membership, capital-labor ratio, average-establishment size, and profit. t-statistics are in parenthesis. Number of observations are 378 for all specifications and panels. 
